NotaBene е електронно списание за философски и политически науки. Повече за нас
ABSTRACT
This is the first chapter of the book on Frege's philosophy of language. The chapter reveals the private and university life of Frege, his ups and downs as a thinker and inventor of the first version of modern logic. Special emphasis is put on the episode related to the famous Russell's paradox which ended for considerable time Frege's work on logic and philosophy of arithmetic. The chapter ends with discussing the political and moral convictions and views of Frege expounded in his fam ous Diary of 1925.
Key words: Frege, Russell paradox, modern logic, logical notation, Frege's diary
ABSTRACT
After presenting a possible classification of paradoxes in general, a particular paradox is considered in the paper. It is maintained that there are no logical fallacies in the argumentation of the paradox but rather that there is a mistake of not taking into account all possible consequences of the premises. Nonetheless the conclusion is that the problem presented by the paradox is not resolved by showing that mistake, and it is suggested that because of this the paradox should be considered very seriously and its importance is comparable with the liar paradox.
Key words: paradox, liar paradox, logical fallacy, argumentation
ABSTRACT:
My goal in this article is to present and compare two articles, written respectively by G. E. Moore and D. Pears, with identical name ‘Is Existence a Predicate?". First, I will try to trace the connection between the main ideas and to show whether there is continuity between them, and then to point out certain confusions and uncertainties. In conclusion, I would like to say that I think Pears was unable to refine the idea that "exists" is not the predicate, and that his thesis at best is only applicable to referential use of indexical singular terms.
Key words: Pears, Moore, predicate, referent, indexical
ABSTRACT:
The paper addresses the question of whether Strawson’s claim that ordinary language has no exact logic entails a view according to which it is in ordinary language’s nature to be ‘illogical’. It is first explained where the traditional idea of an exact, language-independent logic comes from, i.e. the idea of a logic which underlies ordinary languages and governs their logical use and which lack – if Strawson’s assumption is right – would leave ordinary languages being ‘illogical’ insofar as there would be nothing to eliminate their logical imperfections. Secondly, it is shown that it is inherent to language – to human language in contrast to animal ones – to be ‘logical’, because language games are typically introduced, explained, learned, and played out in a practice of giving and asking for reasons , which means, so to speak, in a ‘logical space’. Thus the fact that ordinary language has no exact logic – in the sense that there is no one-to-one correspondence between its (grammatico-)syntactic and its (logico-)semantic sentence forms – does not exclude the possibilities for it to be used in a logical manner.
Key words: Strawson, ordinary language, logicality, logical space of reasons.
Astract
The paper addresses the question of whether Strawson’s claim that ordinary language has no exact logic entails a view according to which it is in ordinary language’s nature to be ‘illogical’. It is first explained where the traditional idea of an exact, language-independent logic comes from, i.e. the idea of a logic which underlies ordinary languages and governs their logical use and which lack – if Strawson’s assumption is right – would leave ordinary languages being ‘illogical’ insofar as there would be nothing to eliminate their logical imperfections. Secondly, it is shown that it is inherent to language – to human language in contrast to animal ones – to be ‘logical’, because language games are typically introduced, explained, learned, and played out in a practice of giving and asking for reasons , which means, so to speak, in a ‘logical space’. Thus the fact that ordinary language has no exact logic – in the sense that there is no one-to-one correspondence between its (grammatico-)syntactic and its (logico-)semantic sentence forms – does not exclude the possibilities for it to be used in a logical manner.
Key words: metaphisics, thinking, framed feature model
Abstract: This article addresses some of the core problems related of realism about art objects. The discussion is limited to the two most general forms of fictional realism: the physical objects hypothesis, and the platonic abstractionism. I contend that while being objects (and not universals), artworks are neither just physical nor they are abstract. In the first part of the article, I outline the most prominent arguments against the physical objects hypothesis without ruling the hypothesis completely out. In the second part of the article, I discuss the two basic paradoxes related to abstractionism about art objects: the paradox of creation and the paradox of standards. The article aims at preparing the ground for a nominalist mixed theory of art objects with both physical and mental components in which the precise kind of ontological dependence of artworks upon concrete objects and events will have the final word.
Abstract: The paper seeks to answer the question what is the space in or of haiku especially in terms of the city as a topos. The answer of this question leads to many pairs of oppositions: internal-external, conscious-unconscious, natural-artificial, sacred-profane, etc. The paper however outlines that haiku is connected to a philosophy of non-duality that is going beyond opposition. Therefore its space is unfolding on the fine gap between oppositions, in the place where the natural and the artificial, the internal and the external are smoothly transforming into each other. On the basis of different examples the paper reveals how the different plans of the inner and outer, human, urban and nature spaces communicate with each other forming the sounding, deep echoing spaces of haiku and of the eternal depths of our being.
Key words: haiku, space, non-duality
Антоанета Николова е родена през 1961 г. в София. Завършила е философия в СУ „Климент Охридски". Преподавател е по Източна философия в ЮЗУ „Неофит Рилски". Автор е на шест поетични книги, както и на философско-поетичното изследване "Езикът на Пустотата" (Колекция Аквариум Средиземноморие, 2003). Съпреводач заедно със София Катърова на антология със старокитайска пейзажна лирика "Поезия на планините и водите" (ИК „Стигмати", 2003), на стихове от будисткия поет и монах Ханшан „Стихове от Студената планина" (ИК „Изток-Запад", 2013), както и на избрани стихове на един от най-известните китайски поети Ли Бай „Прокуденият от небесата" (ИК „Изток-Запад", 2014). Нейни стихове са публикувани в антологии и списания на немски, английски, унгарски, японски и руски. Член е на Сдружение на български писатели, хайку клуб „София" и Световната хайку асоциация.